Legal Weapons of the Wealthy The Offshoring of Elite Conflict in Emerging Markets

In Legal Weapons of the Wealthy, Nikhil Kalyanpur examines a striking feature of today’s global legal order: the use of foreign courts by elites to settle domestic disputes.

On the surface, the “outsourcing” of disputes by elites from countries with fragile judiciaries looks like a search for fair treatment unavailable at home. Yet extraterritorial dispute resolution varies across such countries. Russian plutocrats, for instance, frequently litigate abroad, whereas Chinese and South African ones rarely do.

Kalyanpur argues that the pursuit of extraterritorial litigation depends on the balance of power between a state and its plutocracy. In contexts of state capture or state control, the transparency costs associated with transnational law deter plutocrats from seeking resolution abroad. But when the state and the plutocracy have relatively equal power, competing interests can lead to political clashes, with different actors asserting themselves. “Losers” of these clashes, locked out of their institutions, now have less to lose from those transparency costs and so seek resolution abroad. As these elites often escape with much of their wealth abroad, “winners” respond by weaponizing transnational legal institutions to seize rivals’ offshore assets and ensure defeated rivals stay defeated.

Through cases from Russia and elsewhere, Kalyanpur unravels the connections between offshore finance, transnational litigation, and intra-elite warfare. He exposes how liberal courts serve as arenas for emerging market power struggles, globalizing conflicts begun at home. As billionaires continue amassing unprecedented power across democracies and autocracies alike, Legal Weapons of the Wealthy lays out how the architects of the liberal economic order defeated themselves by enabling rule by the rich.